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THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
law has clearly reached a crisis in its development. For a period of nearly
years preceding the outI NTERNATIONAL
break of the present war international law appeared to the cas300

ual observer· to have grown steadily and progressively. The student
of history was able to point out certain clear and definite advances
in the development of the law and assign them to particular dates.
Grotius could be pronounced the Father of International Law, and
the year 1625, which marked the appearance of his great treatise,
could be set as the beginning of the modern period. A noticeable
improvement in the law of neutrality could ·be traced in the principles laid down· ·by Vattel in 1758 and ·by the First and Second
Armed Neutrality of l78o and l8oo. The formation of the Holy
Alliance marked a reaction in the policy of intervention. The Declaration of Paris saw a reform in the rules of maritime war. And
beginning with the Geneva Convention of 1864 down to the close
of the Second Hague Conference a definite progress could be marked in the amelioration of the lot of non-combatants in war and in
the restrictions put upon the methods and instruments of warfare;
while as a check upon war itself arbitration courts had been pro·
vided and a general pronouncement obtained from the natiom
of the desirability of resorting to them. On the whole it seemed
as if international law was developing with the times and adapting
itself to modern ideals, and except on a few purely formal points it
appeared to bear a fair comparison with the municipal law of the
individual state.
A rude awakening came with the month of August, 19!4. What.
ever advances might have been set down to the credit of internation.
al law within recent years the bald fact stood out that international
law had failed to stand the pressure put upon it and had collapsed
at the very moment of greatest need. Of what avail was an elabor~
ate law for times of peace if it was without authority to maintain
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the condition of peace? Of what worth were restrictions upon the
conduct of war when the restrictions, even if observed, still left war
an evil of such vast proportions? The full measure of the illogical
character of international law was thus taken in one swift moment
of reflection. International law was clearly out of touch with the
times.
The failure of international law to respond to the demands made
upon it has been ascribed to various causes: in the first place international law has been shown to the a law without effective sanction,
and by comparison with the municipal law of the individual state
this defect has been made sufficiently clear; others have pointed
out that international courts must be created for the settlement of
disputes between states and resort to them in a given case made obligatory upon the parties; others still have urged that a permanent
international conference should remain in session at the Hague, entrusted with a general guardianship of international interests and
ready to act as mediator when conflicts of claims arise between
the nations. It is 'the purpose of the present paper to direct attention to a serious flaw in the sources from which the law is drawn,
and to suggest a reform in the methods of law-making at present
followed by the nations.
The great body of international law has developed by what may 1be
called an informal agreement of the nations. The rules of conduct
which it prescribes, the rights and duties which it assigns to tlie states
bound by it, are not the product of legislative enactment but have
grown up by the slow process of common usage. This was necessarily the case in a community of states recognizing no common
political superior, no supra-national power possessing the authority
to impose its laws upon subject communities. From the legal as well
as the political point of view the nations are no more than a group
of independent units voluntarily agreeing to observe certain rules
to which they have given their implied or express· consent. These
rules rest therefore upon a purely contractual basis, and have no
element of the command of a political superior to a political inferior regarded by Austin as essential to true law. Whether they can
nevertheless meet the conditions of law as an historical fact is a
question apart from our present purpose; they are in any case not
law in the same sense in which that term is at present used within
the boundaries of the individual state.
Contract being the basis of international law we look for the
sources of the law in the facts of international life which appear to
embody an agreement of the nations to be bound by a given rule.
The most important group of such facts are the practices of nations
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which have been followed with sufficient regularity and consistency
as to take the form of fixed custom. Custom thus embodies the implied consent of the parties following it. It has its origin in the
free practice of individual nations; then in time other nations are led
from motives of convenience or from the pressure of moral compulsion by their stronger neighbors to adopt the same practice, and
in its last stage of development the particular rule has obtained
sufficient standing to be quoted as a precedent for guidance in subsequent cases. Thus- international law has followed more or less the
lines of development of the early English common law, drawing its
authority from tradition and testing the right of a particular claim
not by the principles of abstract justice, but ·by the old familiar
law of the land. It represents the legal relations of a community of
states not yet sufficiently organized to define and codify their
rights and obligations in detail, but nevertheless ready to appeal
to the precedents of the past in proof of the legality of a claim in
the present.
But custom as a source of international law, and indeed the
chief· source, is open to serious objections. The most serious of
these objections is that customary law is an uncertain law. It is
the culmination of a series of acts regularly observed and of principles consistently followed. But how are we to determine the number of reiterated acts which constitutes regular observance, or the
frequency of the appeal to a principle necessary to show general acceptance? There has been no central court of the nations ready, as
in the case of the common law courts, to apply the rules of customary law and to distinguish between irregular practice and the traditional rule. What adds to the difficulty in the case of international
law is that the number of nations being relatively small there have
been too few cases presenting substantially the same facts to make it
possible to deduce a common rule from them, unless it be one of the
most general character. When the United States argued before the
Geneva tribunal that it was the duty of a neutral to prevent its ports
from being used as a base of supplies for her enemy anq as the
starting point of hostile expeditions, her advocates could present
no earlier cases in which that duty had been recognized under
sufficiently similar circumstances to warrant an inference of legal
obligation. The general principle appeared correct; its application to
the particular facts was, although logical, nevertheless not familiar.
In the absence of a code of recorded custom we turn to the other
evidences of accepted usage, but find them deficient in many respects. Jurists and scholars have undertaken to compile the rules
of international law in force at the time of their writing, but the
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record of international usage as presented in these treatises is not
in all cases reliable. For it is only of recent years that writers
as a body have adopted a strictly positive attitude towards international law. Many of the earlier works reflect the personal interpretation of the author, and are more concerned with the ideal
rule of conduct than with the rule actually observed. A careful
study of the classic work of Vattel, which exercised wide influence
in the latter part of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries
fails to reveal any clear line between the actual law as exhibited in
custom and the law as the author conceived it should be. And
if we turn from treatises to the decisions of national and international tribunals it is still more difficult to determine whether the
rule followed by the court really represents the existing usage. In
the case of national courts the theory is that international law is
part of the law of the land and must be ascertained by the courts
whenever cases involving such questions are presented to them. But
few national courts have been altogether free from ·bias in their
interpretation of the custom of nations. In the case of the Paquete
Habana (175 U.S. 677) Mr. Justice Gray reviews the whole field of
usage and treaty and juristic opinion in his search for the law on
the status of captured enemy fishing vessels, and he reaches the conclusion, contrary to the claim of the United States, that their
exemption from capture is "an established rule of international law"
independently of any express agreement of the nations on the subject. A less liberal interpretation of custom may be seen in the case
of the West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. Re:>: [1905] 2 K.
B. 391, where the court refused to recognize as a rule of international law the obligation of a conquering nation to succeed to the debts
of the conquered at the instance of a private creditor, in spite
of the large body of evidence to show the existence of such a rule.
This bias of national courts is particularly noticeable in the case of
admiralty courts administering prize law, as in the judgments of the
British courts during the Napoleonic wars and the United States
courts during the American Civil War, where rules of contraband and blockade were laid down for which no general custom of
the nations could possibly !be claimed. By contrast with national
courts the decisions of international courts of arbitration would seem
to offer more reliable evidence of the law. But the history of such
cases shows that it has too often happened that the arbitral court
has rendered its award rather in the form of a compromise satisfactory to both parties than in the form of a judicial decision on
the law.
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In addition to the uncertainty of custom there are other difficulties which impair its value as a source of international law. In
the first place custom is of too slow growth to keep pace with the
changing relations of the states which it endeavors to regulate.
In the absence of international statutes sweeping aside the traditions
of the customary law, as statutes of Parliament from time to time
swept aside .the outworn traditions of the English common law,
international law has in many of its important features lagged far
behind the newer phases of international relations brought about
by the social and commercial intercourse of modem times. The
development of democratic and constitutional governments and the
increasing complexity of international finance and trade have left
the law of nations practically unchanged. The theory of the sover·
eignty of the state is substantially what it was when states were, by
comparison with present conditions, isolated units economically
as well as politically independent. The tide of immigration from
Europe to America which set in with the second quarter of the 19th
century found the British and American courts still clinging to the
old doctrine of indelible allegiance, and while the executive and
legislative departments of the American government were struggling
to introduce a new rule of expatriation more in accordance with the
new conditions, the judicial department as expounder of the existing
law remained unmoved. Even to-day it can scarcely be said that the
right of expatriation is a principle of international law.
Instances of this tendency of customary law to cling to the past
might be multiplied indefinitely. Perhaps the most striking example of its failure to adapt itself to the new conditions is to ·be
found in the recent controversy ibetween the United States and the
Teutonic powers with regard to the right of citizens of a neutral
state to sell arms and ammunition to a belligerent. There can be no
doubt that when Jefferson, in answer to the complaints of the
British minister that French agents were buying arms in the United
States, asserted in 1793 that such commerce was not in violation
of the law of nations, his interpretation of neutral obligation was
correct. The same position was taken by successive Secretaries
of State during the 19th century, and as late as 1907 a formal convention of the Second Hague Conference confirmed the traditional
rule. Yet all the while the conditions of international life were
changing and no account was taken of them. In the case of the
United States as presented to the tribunal of arbitration at Geneva
in 1871-2, an attempt was made by the United States to introduce an
exception to the rule in cases where merchant vessels of the enemy
had carried on in a neutral port such an extensive commerce in arti-
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des of war as to constitute the neutral port the main if not the
only base of· military supplies. But the contention of the United
States could not be applied as a rule of law simply because it dealt
with circumstances which had not arisen before and with regard to
which there were no precedents. By an odd coincidence the very
argument made by the United States at Geneva was repeated by
Germany in 1915. The German government contended in a memorandum of April 4th that the United States was "the only neutral
country in a position to furnish war materials" and that the conception of neutrality was thereby "given a new purport, independently of the formal question of hitherto existing law"; moreover,
"an entirely new industry" had been created. In reply the United
States urged that the shipments of arms were in accordance with
the _accepted law of neutrality, and that any change in such laws in
time of war would be itself in violation of neutrality. Conceding
the validity of the answer of the United States on the point of traditional law, it can scarcely be denied that conditions were such as
to call for a new rule. !While the old law has the advantage of rendering less necessary elaborate preparations for war in the case of
a state to which neutral trade is accessible, it presents the anomaly of
a nation legally neutral yet practically an ally of the enemy.
A further defect of custom as a source of international law is
its inability to reorganize a system which is defective as a whole,
or even to amend certain parts of it along progressive lines looking to the future. Most of the important reforms' of international
law have come about by the action of a single state or group of
states asserting rights not previously aclmowledged and maintaining them in the face of opposition, until at last the inherent justice
of the claim, aided by the power of the states supporting it, has
come to obtain general acceptance. To cite one instance out of
many, the rights and obligations of neutrality were far from clear
when Jefferson laid down certain principles to be followed by the
United States government during the war between France and
Great Britian in 1793-4. A Neutrality Act was passed pronouncing
definitely that certain acts, whether of citizen or of alien, would be
considered by the United States as a violation of its neutrality, and
penalizing them as crimes against the law of the state. That the
law of the United States went beyond existing international obligations is unquestionable, but the principles it embodied in due time
found their way into the general code of international conduct, and
may now be found in various articles of the 5th and 13th Conventions adopted at the Second Hague Conference. An additional
instance is to ·be found in the principles advanced by the First and
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Second "Armed Neutrality", which were first asserted in resistance
to the practices of Great Britain, and which with one exception
ultimately won general recognition as the correct rule of law.
A second form of contractual obligation between the nations is
the explicit acceptance of a given rule by the adoption of a formal
treaty stipulating for it. But it must be noted, contrary to a common misconception, that treaties are only sources of international
law when adopted ·by the nations as a body. Treaties between two
individual nations embody merely the consent of the parties to them,
and therefore have no effect upon the relations of other states. It
has, however, happened that on a few points international law has
developed from bilateral agreements between the states of the
world taken two by two; in illustration of which may be mentioned
the numerous treaties of extradition which have undoubtedly made
the general practice of returning fugitive criminals an accepted rule
of international law, though still lacking in recognition by the
nations collectively. On the other hand it has sometimes happened
that when all or a majority of the great powers have been parties
to a treaty, as for example the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the
weight of their influence has been thrown in favor of the adoption
of the rule in question by other nations, so that in due time it has
become part of the general law. This transition from limited to
general law has sometimes ·been expressly provided for in the treaty
itself ·by a clause inviting nations not parties to it to adhere to it.
It is only since the meeting of the First Hague Conference in
1899 that treaties have come to be a direct source of international
law. At that Conference important agreements were entered into
by the whole body of states, which gave universal application to
certain existing usages of limited practice, abolished certain others,
prescribed new rules of international conduct, defined rights and
imposed definite obligations. The Hague Conference of 1907 went
still further in concluding general conventions, though as in the
case of the Conference of 1899 the agreements relate for the most
part to the conduct of war. It -is important, however, to note that
before those conventions can ·be regarded as part of the settled law,
a condition attached to them, to the effect that a particular convention may at any time be denounced by the parties to it upon
giving due notice, must be removed. This may ·be done in either of
two ways: by the direct rejection of the right of denunciation by
means of a formal agreement to that effect, or ·by the gradual loss
of the right when the subject-matter of the convention has grown
into a rule of customary law. A further point of importance to be
noted in judging of the authority of the Hague conventions is that
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many of their provisions merely codify existing custom, and in
consequence the rule so codified continues to be binding even though
the formal convention should fail of ratification or be denounced
after having been ratified. Hence the excuse made in the present
war for the violation of certain provisions of the Hague conventions,
that the particular convention had not been signed by all the belligerents, is of no value if the rule was previously part of the customary law.
In the face of the inherent defects in the sources from which
international law is drawn it is not difficult to understand why the
law has failed to keep in touch with the needs of the times. The
problem now presented is whether the reform of the law can be
accomplished along the lines follow(!d in the past or whether a new
and more constructive system must be introduced in the form of an
international legislative body capable of amending old rules and
introducing new ones by authoritative degree. It is doubtful if the
nations will continue to be satisfied with the old methods. What
statutes have done for the development of the common law the acts
of an international parliament must do for the development of international law. Rights and duties must be more definitely defined,
the restrictions upon the sovereignty of the state, now a sort of
twilight zone in international relations, must be brought out into
the light, and a clear rule of intervention, no longer individual but
collective, must be adopted. The equality of nations must be given
a legal meaning and outworn theories, long since negatived in practice, must be formally discarded. Rights of property, at present in
a state of utter confusion, must be rearranged and systematized to
meet the demands of international peace. Present treaty rights
must be changed to give them, in respect to interpretation and
binding force, more of the status of contract at private law. These
and other radical amendments in the law are vitally needed, and
the slow process of customary observance together with the conditional and half-hearted agreements of the Hague conventions are
simply inadequate to bring them about.
It is not difficult to understand that if the substance of international law can be amended so as to give greater clearness and precision to the rights and obligations of nations the settlement of international disputes by judicial methods will be greatly facilitated.
However perfect the machinery of courts of arbitration, it cannot
be expected that the nations will resort freely to them in the absence of a more definite code of law. Hitherto the nations have
been asked to submit their claims to a court possessing no judicial
traditions and no recognized rule of decision, and in consequence
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where arbitration has been resorted to in the past it has frequently
been necessary for the parties to frame a special agreement in advance stipulating the principles which are to govern the decision of
the case. The difficulty of framing this rule has often 'been as great
as the difficulty of obtaining the consent of the parties to arbitrate.
Moreover in the case of general arbitration treaties which provide
for the settlement of future disputes the exceptions from the agreement to arbitrate, noticeable in the treaties of 19o8, of questions
relating to honor and vital interests are without logical foundation,
except in so far as many of the important rights of. nations are still
in a state of uncertainty. The distinction between justiciable and
non-justiciable questions is likewise called for by the defects of the
law. All questions between citizen and citizen of the state are
justiciable, and all questions between nations could in point of law
be made so if the law were clear upon the rights and obligations of
the parties. What are commonly called political disputes, and as
such not regarded as susceptible of decision by arbitral courts, are
nothing more than the conflicting claims of nations in cases where
there. is no definite rule of decision. They are disputes arising out
of the old theory of sovereignty which has stubbornly held its own
through all the modem period of international development. They
can be brought under the law only when the source from which they
spring has been subjected to legal restrictions.
The establishment of an international court of arbitration with
truly judicial functions is one of the most important demands of
the new era of international reorganization. But this court, as we
have seen, is largely dependent upon the existence of an international legislature, if it is to extend its jurisdictio~ over the many
cases now excluded from it. Nothing less than the enactment of
positive rules of law will succeed in establishing the international
court in a position of authority over the states in those cases where
recourse to a court of justice is most needed. In the future the
development of the substantive law must, if not precede, at least go
hand in hand with the development of. the law of procedure.
CHARLES
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